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Abstract
Assessing the reliability performance of complex system involves dealing with 
events whose occurrence cannot be predicted easily. Not only a good 
descriptive procedure of the system's components is required but the solution 
requires some means by which the likelihood of the events can be expressed 
in terms of quantitative methods. This can be done by adopting a probabilistic 
risk and reliability assessment method to assess system behaviour. This 
requires enhancing the reliability analysis with a probabilistic risk analysis 
technique. The procedure of integration suggested in this work is called 
Probabilistic Risk Analysis [PRA]. It involves: 1) Identification of the potential 
events of failures and their modes of failures. 2) Estimation of the 
consequences of these failures on the total system. 3) Estimation of the 
probability of occurrence of each event of failure. 4) Comparison of the results 
of the analysis against an acceptability criterion or criteria. The third step is 
the focus of this paper where the novelty of this work appears. Rather than 
drawing a deterministic FTD for identifying probability of occurrences of the 
failure events a probabilistic one is suggested to cater for any risks or 
uncertainties involved in the system. By allowing probabilistic input of basic 
events a probabilistic top event is produced giving managers more freedom to 
check among a range of failure probabilities that the system might fall in 
rather than one limited deterministic failure value. This gives more practicality 
to the assessment of the whole system resulting in better actions and higher 
reliable performance. 
1. Systems Failure and Their Causes
Failure of a system or a component in a system can be a catastrophic 
phenomenon which may result in severe physical and social consequences. 
Systems failure - either engineering systems, management systems or socio-
technical ones or other sort of defined systems - can be caused by a vast 
number of factors which may interactively contribute towards the failure of a 
system’s performance as a whole. As Sauer [1] put it in his study for systems 
failures: "All kinds of technological and organisational systems suffer failure".
Typically, each type of system experiences a different kind of failure within its 
own field. Sauer's statement can be seen to be valid when it comes to 
complex systems which is expected to work in complex interrelated 
subsystems. However, the major problem that faces systems engineers is the 
quantification of risk involved in the performance of the system with its 
different components. Obviously, this quantification will facilitate the prediction 
of the system success or its failure and malfunctioning. Thus, the problem of 
risk quantification should be fully recognised and thoroughly looked into to get 
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personal opinion, there is a big drawback in the way systems engineers
assess their system performance, mainly due to: 
1. Only applying deterministic methods in their assessment without 
forecasting or understanding the stochastic nature of the factors 
influencing the system's internal and external performance. 
2. Lack of establishment of a reliable and effective method by which they can 
monitor, audit and evaluate all component performance and predict the 
possibilities of failure in their functions before accepting the system for 
operation.
2. System Reliability Assessment
To avoid these drawbacks systems engineers need a method that can ensure 
the robustness and flexibility of their system to cope with any malfunctioning
and uncertainties. They need to perform system reliability assessment to 
evaluate the performance of all the individual components of the system. 
Reliability analysis offers the solution. Furthermore, in order to understand the
probabilistic nature of the system this paper suggests that systems engineers
should not only apply qualitative reliability techniques in assessing the 
performance of their system but quantitative probabilistic risk methods must 
also be introduced [2] and [3]. Unfortunately, most studies done in reliability 
evaluation highlight and diagnose the problem in qualitative rather than 
quantitative terms [4]. Confirming the importance of introducing quantitative 
reliability methods Andrews and Moss [5] showed that reliability technology 
has benefited significantly from applying some qualitative and quantitative 
reliability techniques such as Fault Trees, Markov and human reliability 
analysis. 
2.1 Terminology and Definition of Reliability
Aggarwal [6] quoted a detailed definition by the Electronics Industries 
Association (EIA) which defined reliability in general terms by stating that:
"Reliability of an item ( a component, a complex system, a computer program 
or a human-being) is defined as the probability of performing its purpose 
adequately for the period of time under the operating and environmental 
conditions encountered". Similar definitions of reliability can be found in 
articles written by a number of authors and reliability theorists such as [7], [8], 
[9], [10], [11], [12] and [13].
2.2 Objective of Probabilistic Analysis
Reliability theory is mainly concerned with the occurrence and non-occurrence 
of failure events. Probability theory, on the other hand, is used along with 
reliability theory to enable managers to determine the chances of occurrence 
of these uncertain events quantitatively. The objective of probabilistic analysis 
of systems is to assess the degree of guarantee, from a system performance
perspective, which can be associated with a given system during its 
operation. Thus assessing the risks associated with system’s components is 
useful for improving their functions by minimising chances of their occurrence. 
33. Risk Assessment
Before analysing systems reliability it is important to understand what is risk 
assessment. Risk assessment is widely recognised as a systematic process
for quantitatively (or qualitatively) describing risk. Bedford and Cook [14] 
characterise risk with two particular elements: hazard (a source of danger) 
and uncertainty (quantified by probability). The total risk is the sum of the 
products of the consequences multiplied by their probabilities.
3.1 The Challenge: Realising the Problem
Expectations of reliability are increasing and the consequences of reducing 
systems failure have never been greater. Systems engineers are committed 
to supplying reliable systems with low risk associated with them. To maintain 
that commitment into the future, systems engineers must address an array of 
uncertainties. In this uncertain environment, the traditional methods of 
performing system reliability assessments are no longer adequate. The 
traditional tools use a deterministic approach to calculate the impact of 
potentially disruptive events, without regard to the probability of their 
occurrence. A probabilistic approach is therefore required for assessing the 
performance of the system with its components.
3.2 The Solution: Introducing the Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Assessing the reliability performance of complex system involves dealing with 
events whose occurrence cannot be predicted easily. Not only a good 
descriptive procedure of the system’s components is required but also the 
solution requires some means by which the likelihood of the events can be 
expressed in terms of quantitative methods. This places an emphasis on the 
importance of enhancing the reliability analysis with probabilistic risk analysis 
technique for evaluating system’s risk in terms of calculating its failure events 
and the corresponding range of probabilities values associated with those 
failures. This procedure of integration has been extensively and successfully 
used to evaluate complex systems under the name of Probabilistic Safety or 
Risk Analysis [PSA/PRA]. PRA is an approach developed over the last 20 
years to estimate quantitatively the risks associated with complex engineering 
systems, such as nuclear power plants, chemical process facilities, waste 
products and space systems.  
4. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Approach
4.1 PRA Characteristics
PRA enables decision makers to balance reliability and risk. PRA provides a 
more accurate tool for assessing systems reliability. Unlike traditional 
deterministic contingency analysis tools, PRA calculates a measure of the 
probability of undesirable events and a measure of their severity or impact. In 
a PRA, risk is characterised by two quantities [15]:
1. The magnitude (severity) of the possible adverse consequence(s) (for 
example failure of a certain component or components in a mechanical 
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socio-technical system, ..etc.).
2. The likelihood (probability) of occurrence of each consequence. (i.e., 
the number of occurrences or the corresponding probability value to 
every departmental failure percentage, etc.). 
PRA usually answers three basic questions [3]:
1. What can go wrong with the studied system, or what are the initiators 
or initiating events (undesirable starting events) that lead to adverse 
consequence(s)? 
2. What and how severe are the potential detriments, or the adverse 
consequences that the system may be eventually subjected to as a 
result of the occurrence of the initiator? 
3. How likely to occur are these undesirable consequences, or what are 
their probabilities or frequencies? 
The answer to the first question is a set of failure scenarios. The second 
question requires the evaluation of the probabilities of these scenarios, while 
the third estimates their consequences. Two common methods of answering 
this last question are the Event Tree Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis [16],
and [17]. The last one is the one this work will employ for illustrating the 
proposed PRA approach.
4.2 PRA Stages
In this work it is recommended to use quantitative risk and reliability 
techniques together with the qualitative ones for building a Probabilistic Risk 
Assessment (PRA) approach for assessing system reliability. The proposed 
PRA involves four main stages under two main risk headings: 
1. Risk estimation: which encompasses a detailed description of the risks 
scenarios, this includes: 
1) Identification of the potential events and their modes of failures.
2) The estimation of the consequences of these failures on the total system.
2.  Risk acceptability: which involves determination of an acceptable level to 
the risk encountered and to ask how safe is safe enough? This includes: 
3) The estimation of the probability of occurrence of each event of failure.
4) Comparison of the results of the analysis against acceptability criteria.
The first two stages of risk estimation are mainly performed using qualitative 
risk and reliability techniques like the Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) to 
represent the connections between system’s components and the Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) to represent the knowledge about the 
system's performance in terms of identifying the potential failing events and 
their mode of failures in addition to their consequences on the total system 
function then preparing what is called Knowledge Base Production Rules 
(KBPR). These methods will be illustrated in the application example at the 
end of this paper. However, for more understanding of how they are prepared 
the reader can refer to references like: [5], [7], [9], [18], [19], and [20]. On the 
other hand, the third and fourth stages of risk acceptability use different 
quantitative techniques to provide the probabilistic assessment suggested in 
this work. For more details, see for example [2], [6], [8], [10] and [21].
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the qualitative Fault Tree Diagram (FTD) of the Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to a 
quantitative one for identifying the probability of occurrences of the system’s 
failure events. This is done by entering the expected failure percentages 
(rates) of all the basic events and their corresponding probabilities values, 
then calculating the expected failure percentages and the corresponding 
probabilities values of all dependent (intermediate) events followed by the top 
undesired event as will be shown in the illustrative example next.
5. Illustrating the PRA Approach in an Example
5.1 Systems Description
To illustrate how the proposed PRA approach in this work can give insight into 
probabilistic evaluation and assessment of reliability to the system 
performance, the system under investigation is a physical system used to 
pass electric power to two terminals personal computers as shown in Figure 
1. The system is composed of a Source (S) motor power which is connected 
in series to a Circuit Breaker (CB). Both are connected in series to two groups 
of couple Transformers (TR1 and TR2) and couple of personal computer 
terminals (PC1 and PC2) where each group of transformers is connected in 
series to one personal computer terminal. Both joined groups are joined in 
parallel connection. The source of this example is obtained from literature on 
reliability evaluation [9]. Similar types of systems can be found in [12] but 
representing electric bulbs instead of computer terminals. 
Figure 1: Computer Network System Original Model
(Source: Pages and Gondran,1986 [9])
5.2 System Reliability Assessment: The PRA Approach
Main assumption: In this computer system, it is assumed that in real 
application any of the components of the system can be defective at any time 
during its operation and that systems engineers cannot wait until they monitor 
the failure of each component in application then record them for future 
remedy actions. Hence a formal reliability evaluation to predict potential 
modes of failures, their possible causes and their effects on the total system 
performance has to be conducted. Furthermore, systems engineers have to 
define the possible failure scenarios of the system and to predict beforehand,
either from previous experience (if it is an existing system) or by guess (if it is 
a new system), the expected failure percentage of every basic event that can 
happen and the likelihood (probability) of its occurrence. To show how this 
reliability evaluation can be performed, the author has developed a DSS 
programme called ManageRely (Management Reliability) to illustrate the 
steps of this PRA approach. The application was initially designed to assess 
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industry. However, the same programme is used, in this work, to illustrate the 
PRA procedure to assess the reliability of this physical computer system.
It is worth mentioning here that a short overview was done on available PRA 
software in the market. There are many Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
(PSA) software packages out there, but there is only one for the serious PSA 
professional: RISKMAN. It incorporates the four major steps of PSA analysis 
into one package: data analysis, system analysis, natural hazard analysis and 
event tree analysis. It makes use of modern mathematical techniques for 
avoiding approximations. However, when approximations must be done, the 
exact value of the error is calculated which can help in reducing the guessing 
of how accurate your results are. SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for 
Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations) is another probabilistic risk and 
reliability assessment software tool developed for the U.S. nuclear regulatory 
commission (NRC) by the Idaho National Laboratory. SAPHIRE gives a user 
the ability to create and analyze fault trees and event trees using a personal 
computer. In terms of reliability evaluation fault trees can be constructed and 
analysed to obtain different measure of system unreliability, event importance 
measures, include: Fussell-Vesely; Birnbaum; risk increase ratio and interval; 
risk reduction ratio and interval; group; and uncertainty importance. Another 
risk analysis software is RiskSpectrum®; Risk Management Software which is 
a product of the most advanced Risk and Reliability Analysis software in the 
world. The software includes advanced tools for fault tree and event tree 
analysis, documentation, risk monitoring and failure mode and effect analysis.
All these packages do not use the 2nd-order assessments as recommended 
by ManagerRely. Although more work required to make ManageRely a 
commercial package, it is sought here that it is still useful in analysing and 
assessing the probability of failure of systems, especially those of 
management systems that does not need high mathematical accuracy as 
mechanical and electrical systems. It can give systems management a sense 
of the ranges the failure of their departments can fall within. This is done using 
a two dimensional probabilistic approach rather than one dimensional
deterministic value.
Figure 2: RBD for the Computer System Model 
(as Appears in ManageRely Programme)
75.3 Steps of the PRA Methodology
The first step in the PRA process starts with the systems engineers
performing a thoroughly systems approach study where the main mission, 
goals and objectives of the system and its components are identified and 
defined. Then, for reliability evaluation, the system is displayed and modelled 
on a chart called Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) showing series, parallel or 
series-parallel relationships between its various components, as in Figure 2.
The second step is to perform PRA as follows: 
A] Applying Qualitative Reliability Techniques: This is done by using:
1) The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis [FMEA]: where a detailed study is 
performed to identify the modes of failure expected in the system and to 
determine their possible causes of failure with their effect on the total system. 
Figure 3 illustrates the FMEA table as represented in ManageRely for the 
whole system. This is followed by applying a qualitative representation called:  
Figure 3: FMEA of The Whole System 
(as Appears in ManageRely Programme)
2)  The Knowledge Based Production Rules [KBPR]: as in Figure 4 which 
aims to represent the knowledge about the system in a comprehensive 
manner using 'If..then" failure scenario. This important technique then
facilitates the application of:
Figure 4: KBPRs For The Computer System
(as Appears in ManageRely Programme)
3)  The Fault Tree Analysis [FTA]:  where the qualitative Fault Tree Diagram 
[qual_FTD] is constructed as shown in Figure 5 where its branches 
demonstrate the KBPR table. FTA has the advantage of identifying the weak 
components of the system on the screen of the computer to assist managers 
to assess their performance and allow to make necessary actions for 
8improving their performance. In this qualitative FTD, as shown in Figure 5, the 
Top Event TE (failure supply to the PC1 and PC2, which means the failure of 
the whole system to operate) is the system's undesired event under analysis. 
It is produced from the occurrence of two Intermediate Events; IE1 (failure 
supply to PC1) and IE2 (failure supply to PC2) connected by an "AND" gate 
showing that both of them have to occur in order that the top event occurs. 
Event IE1 is produced from Basic Event; BE1 (primary failure of Transformers
TR1) and two intermediate events; IE1-1 (complete failure of Source 
component S) and IE1-2 (complete failure of Circuit Breaker component CB) 
which are all connected by an 'OR' gate showing that only one of them has to 
occur in order that IE1 occurs. Similarly, event IE2 is produced from BE6 
(primary failure of Transformers TR2) and intermediate events IE1-1 and IE1-
2 represented by two triangle transfer gates 1 and 2. Event IE1-1 is produced 
from basic events BE2 (primary failure of the S component) and BE3 (primary 
failure of supply line to the S component). While IE1-2 is produced from basic 
events BE4 (primary failure of supply line to the CB) and BE5 (fire in the 
equipment room of the CB).  
B] Applying Quantitative Reliability and Risk Techniques 
As stressed in this work, qualitative reliability techniques are not enough to 
achieve reliable results. The results of the qualitative analysis are only 
descriptive which cannot give any feeling of the dangers encountered in the 
performance of the system. Hence, a thorough quantitative analysis should be 
conducted to enhance the previous qualitative reliability techniques with some 
useful quantitative ones. Hence, a quantified evaluation is done for the 
qualitative FTD. The designed programme offers friendly interactive screens 
for producing the probability curves in a relative frequency form as well as in 
cumulative form. This is the quantitative Fault Tree Diagram [quant_FTD].
Figure 5: Qualitative FTD Of The Computer System 
(as Appears in ManageRely Programme)
Failure Values and Probability Inputs / Calculations:
a) Deterministic Type of Failure Values: in this option it is assumed that 
systems engineers are confident (i.e. certain) about the percentage failure 
value (events performance level) that is likely to happen for each basic event. 
9Users are offered the freedom to input the deterministic value of failure 
percentage on the horizontal scale from 0% to 100% as shown on the graph 
in the top right corner of the screen in Figure 6 where the input for basic event 
BE1 is illustrated. Because this is a certain value its chance of occurrence is 
also certain i.e. automatically the probability of any percentage value of failure 
chosen is equal to 1.0.  
b) Stochastic Types of Failure Values: These are either objective or 
subjective types of probabilities of failures:
1) Objective Probability Type: In this type of probability it is assumed that 
the user has previous knowledge about the performance of the component, 
for example, from previous experience or previous records, hence s/he can 
input the percentage values of failures that are expected to happen and their
likely chances of occurrences.
Figure 6: Example of Objective Probability Calculation Of Basic Event BE1 
(Primary Failure of Transformers TR1)
Figures 6 shows the objective failure percentage inputs and calculations of 
the probabilities of the basic event BE1 (primary failure of TR1) on the FTD. 
The graph produces the relative frequency curve from which automatically the 
cumulative probability curve is obtained as shown in Figure 6.
2) Subjective Probability Type: Figures 8 shows the different procedures 
used for inputting and calculating the subjective probability curves of the basic 
events. In this method ManageRely offers two techniques. These are: (1) The 
Fractile method (The Interview method) and (2) The Utility method (The 
Lottery method) [22]. In both techniques, the probability curve is first plotted in 
a cumulative form from which the relative frequency curve is deduced then 
every basic event expected failure percentage and its corresponding 
probability value are calculated. In Figure 8 the Fractile method is used to 
produce the probability curve of basic event BE2 while the Utility method is 
used to determine the curve of basic event BE6. The other basic events BE3,
BE4 and BE5 were obtained using the direct objective probability inputs.
The third step in this PRA approach is to calculate the probability values of the 
dependent events (intermediate events and top event) as shown in Figure 8. 
As in normal FTA calculations, this is done by using the laws of addition (for 
OR gates events) and multiplication (for AND gates events) of the expected 
failure percentage values and the corresponding probability values of all basic 
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events. This produces the probabilistic values of the intermediate events and 
the top undesired event.
In this part, it is worth noting here that there is a debate on how meaningful 
2nd-order probabilities can be assigned, in particular as 1st order probabilities 
are recognized to be problematic. Due to limited space and as this is not 
within the scope of this paper to explain the different methods for explaining 
this problem, however a number of literatures like [22] and [23] explains some 
methods to solve this problem as well as other literature reviewed the means 
and methods on determining assessing risks with evaluating second order 
probability [23], the uncertainty in PRA [24] and eliciting probabilities from 
Experts [25].
6.  Interpretation of the Results
6.1 Interpretation of Results From The Deterministic Approach
To reveal the difference between the deterministic risk approach and the 
probabilistic risk approach as proposed in this work, a deterministic FTA is 
performed with all basic events entered as deterministic (i.e. certain) one 
failure percentage value with a probability value of 1.0 as shown in Figure 7. 
Accordingly, the top event gave a value of failure = 92.82% with certainty (i.e. 
P(92.82%) = 1.0). By inspecting the tree it would be noticed that this high 
value was obtained from multiplying (AND gate) the failures of IE1 [P(95.11%) 
= 1.0] and IE2 [P(97.59%) = 1.0]. Obviously IE2 (failure of Supply PC2) 
contributed more to the top event failure value. Therefore by tracing the tree 
back to investigate why IE2 is so high, it would be found that it came from the 
addition rule (OR gate) of IE1-1 (68.05%) and IE1-2 (69.55%) and BE6 
(69.86%). Since IE1-1 (failure of S) and IE1-2 (failure of CB) are common in 
both branches of the tree as represented by the transfer triangle gates 1 and 
2 on the tree, therefore the cause of this high value is due to BE6 (primary 
failure of TR2). Systems engineers should now find why the group of 
Transformers TR2 is not performing as expected since it is contributing with a 
high value to the failure of the whole system. 
Figure 7: Inputs and Calculations Of The Failure Events On 
     The FTD--[Deterministic Approach]  [ManageRely Screen Dump]
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6.2 Interpretation of Results From The  Probabilistic Approach
As claimed in this work, the deterministic approach is not reliable to make a 
good understanding of the system performance as the failures of the basic 
events are obtained with certainty and this limits the thinking of systems 
engineers to accepting one output value of failure of the dependent events 
and the top event which does not reflect a realistic view about the system 
operation in real life application and may result in wrong management actions.
Therefore, it is believed that the probabilistic FTD as in Figure 8 gives more 
realistic and reliable idea about the system performance. By inspecting the 
probabilistic FTD where the basic events are entered in a probabilistic fashion 
as described in the previous section, it was found that the top event's 
expected failure gave a failure value of 40.49% with probability of 0.664 i.e. 
P(40.49%) = 0.664 not with certainty as in the deterministic interpretation 
producing an overall risk value of 26.885 [i.e. 40.49 (consequence) x 0.664 
(probability)]. By continue inspecting the tree it would be noticed that this 
value was obtained from multiplying the failures of IE1 [P(64.14%) = 0.81] and 
IE2 [P(63.12%) = 0.82]. Obviously IE1 (failure of Supply PC1) with risk value 
of 51.953 is higher than IE2 with risk value of 51.758. Hence IE1 contributed 
more to the top event failure value. Also by tracing down the tree to 
investigate why IE1 is so high, it would be found that it came from the addition 
rule of IE1-1[P(14.57%) = 0.15] with risk value of 2.1855 and IE1-2 
[P(40.00%) = 0.68] with risk value of 27.20 and BE1 [P(29.75%) = 0.42] with 
risk value of 12.60. Since IE1-1 (failure of S) and IE1-2 (failure of CB) are 
common in both branches of the tree as represented by the transfer triangle 
gates 1 and 2 on the tree, therefore the cause of IE1 value is due to BE1
(primary failure of Transformer TR1) which is higher than BE6 [P(28.05%) = 
0.34] with risk value of 9.537. This means that chances of causing the overall 
probability of failure of the whole system (i.e. the top event) with a risk value 
of 26.885 is contributed to the malfunctioning of Transformers TR1 not 
Transformers TR2 as given by the deterministic approach. This is an 
important finding that systems engineers have to take care of when choosing 
risk approaches for assessing systems’ reliability.
Fail (Pc1+PC2 Fail sys)
Fail (Terminal PC1) Fail (Terminal PC2)
Failure (Source) Failure (Circ. Break.)
Transformer TR2
Cal.F = 14.57%
Cal.P = 0.15
Figure 8: Inputs and Calculations Of The Failure Events On 
      The FTD--[Probabilistic Approach]  [ManageRely Screen Dump]
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7. Conclusions
In the reliability context, assessing the reliability performance of complex 
systems involves dealing with events whose occurrences are sometimes not 
easily predicted. Handling such events which are not deterministic (i.e. 
stochastic or uncertain) is thus an important issue facing systems designers.
This paper focuses on the importance and effectiveness of assessing the 
reliability of the overall system performance by offering a probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) approach for assessing its individual components and to 
help them to analyse and thoroughly understand the behaviour of the system
realistically and ensure its success and survival in long-term applications.
By inspecting and comparing between the deterministic and the proposed 
PRA approach this study revealed the benefit of quantifying the FTD as it 
helped in pointing out the defective components which need to be checked, 
monitored or replaced for more reliable performance of the whole system. 
Similarly systems engineers can track the probabilistic FTD to identify other
defective components in the system for taking proper remedial actions to 
improve the whole system reliability. Additionally, if systems engineers for 
example, set an acceptability criteria value of expected failure percentage of 
50% or less with corresponding probability value of 75% to consider the 
system performance satisfactory, i.e. P(System Failure % <= 50%) = 0.75], 
then by inspecting the deterministic approach the result of the top event 
(representing system failure) is P(92.82%) = 1.0 which in most cases will not 
satisfy this requirement as the resulting probability will always be 1.0 while the 
more realistic probabilistic approach satisfies this requirement where 
P(40.49%) = 0.664. It is thus believed that this PRA approach is more realistic 
to apply than the deterministic one as it proves impractical to accept one 
certain (deterministic) value of failure by which the component(s) could fail. By
allowing probabilistic input of basic events a probabilistic top event is 
produced giving managers more freedom to check among a range of failure 
probabilities that the system might fall in rather than one limited deterministic 
failure value. This gives more practicality to the assessment of the whole 
system resulting in better actions and higher reliable system performance.
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